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SENATOR EDMUND MUSKIE’S ENDURING 
LEGACY IN THE COURTS 
Richard J. Lazarus* 
More than any other legislator in the nation’s history, Senator Ed Muskie is 
environmental law’s champion.  Over forty years ago, Muskie helped secure 
passage of an extraordinary series of ambitious and demanding air and water 
pollution control laws that sought no less than to redefine the relationship of 
humankind here in the United States to our natural environment.  The upshot has 
been the nation’s enjoyment, for more than four decades, of enormous economic 
growth without the kind of accompanying environmental destruction witnessed 
during the same time period in nations lacking such controls. 
While President Richard Nixon is properly credited as playing a critical role 
alongside Muskie in promoting tougher environmental laws,1 Nixon’s role is both 
routinely overstated2 and best understood as yet another expression of Muskie’s 
influence.  Nixon can be fairly touted for creating the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and trumpeting, along with Muskie, passage of the federal Clean 
Air Act,3 the nation’s first comprehensive pollution control law that imposed 
sweeping and ambitious restrictions on emissions of air pollutants from motor 
vehicles and stationary sources.  What is too often forgotten is that Nixon’s 
environmentalism was short-lived (lasting less than two years), was largely a 
product of political posturing rather than personal ideology, and was clearly aimed 
at undercutting Muskie’s prospects as Nixon’s Democratic opponent in the 1972 
Presidential campaign.4  As soon as Nixon perceived there was less to be gained 
politically in promoting environmental protection than by appealing to business 
                                                                                                     
 * Howard J. & Katherine W. Aibel Professor of Law Harvard Law School.  This essay is based on 
a talk I delivered on November 15, 2014, at the Edmund S. Muskie Centennial Celebration—
Connecting Law and Legislature: The Legacy of Senator Muskie, sponsored by the Maine Law Review.  
I would like to thank Ryland Li and Anna Gunderson, both Harvard Law School Class of 2015 for their 
assistance in the preparation of this essay: Mr. Li, for his outstanding research assistance in support of 
the talk and this published essay, including the surveys of the number of references to Senator Muskie in 
published opinions and Supreme Court oral arguments; and Ms. Gunderson, for her excellent editorial 
assistance.  
 1. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 76 (2004); J. BROOKS 
FLIPPEN, NIXON AND THE ENVIRONMENT 227-28 (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick, Lost in Watergate’s Wake: Nixon’s Green Legacy, CLIMATE CENTRAL 
BLOG (August 8, 2012), http://www.climatecentral.org/blogs/richard-nixon-the-environmentalist-resigned-38-
years-ago-today-14776 (the article mistakenly credits Nixon for Clean Water Act of 1972, which was enacted 
only because Congress overrode the President’s veto). 
 3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. 
 4. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 77; FLIPPEN, supra note 1, at 27 (“Nixon always had Muskie 
on his mind.”) (quoting Russell Train, Nixon’s Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality).  
The focus on Muskie is highlighted by how, according to Nixon’s Chief of Staff,  H.R. 
Haldeman, Nixon on July 23, 1971, concluded that emphasizing  “economics and the economy” 
was “more important than undercutting  Muskie” on the environment. See H.R. Haldeman, H. R. 
Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973, National Archives and Records 
Administration,   http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/haldeman-diaries/37-
hrhd-audiocassette-ac11ab-19710723-pa.pdf.  
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interests opposed to those efforts, the President did a quick about-face.5  Nixon at 
first acted quietly behind the scenes to work against tougher pollution control 
limitations.  But then he became more public, culminating in his veto of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. 
While Muskie’s Congress represents lawmaking at its best, Congress since 
1990 has been the exact opposite: Congress at its worst.6  The spirit of 
bipartisanship and constructive compromise that Muskie fostered and that was 
crucial to his success has since collapsed.  While we once had environmental law 
because of Congress, we now have environmental law without Congress.7  In the 
absence of any new, significant environmental legislation, the United States EPA’s 
only recourse is to address today’s pressing environmental problems with statutory 
language drafted by lawmakers almost a half-century ago with very different 
problems in mind.8  Although that language has proven remarkably durable, the 
EPA faces considerable barriers in litigation challenging its efforts. And nowhere is 
that challenge more apparent than in EPA’s current efforts to apply the existing 
Clean Air Act to address climate change. 
The purpose of this paper is to focus on Muskie’s enduring legacy in federal 
court litigation in which EPA has defended its implementation of the laws that 
Muskie championed.  To that end, this article is divided into two parts:  Part I 
generally describes the remarkable extent to which judges have sought to determine 
Muskie’s views on a particular issue in deciding whether EPA’s actions are 
consistent with congressional intent.  Senator Muskie has not served in the Senate 
since 1980, yet judges and advocates today continue to debate Muskie’s views in 
determining the legality of EPA actions.  Part II focuses more specifically on 
EPA’s current efforts to invoke its Clean Air Act authorities to address the 
worldwide threat of climate change.  What EPA’s most recent final and proposed 
rulemakings make clear, especially in light of the litigation launched to challenge 
those rulemakings, is Muskie’s continuing relevance today as the nation continues 
to depend on the statutes he championed to address our most pressing 
environmental problems. 
I.  SENATOR MUSKIE IN THE COURTS 
The settled touchstone for determining the meaning of statutory language is 
congressional intent.  Where Congress has enacted language with “plain meaning,” 
the Supreme Court has long made clear that the judicial presumption must be that 
Congress intended that plain meaning to control.9  And neither the judicial branch 
nor an agency responsible for administering the statute can overcome the plain 
meaning of that statutory language.  But, where Congress has instead enacted 
language the meaning of which is ambiguous, then the courts must defer to the 
                                                                                                     
 5.  LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 77-78.   
 6. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative 
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619 (2006). 
 7. Richard Lazarus, Environmental Law Without Congress, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2015). 
 8. See generally Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1 (2014). 
 9. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
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reasonable interpretation of the agency charged by Congress with its 
administration, so long as that agency is acting pursuant to its legislatively 
delegated lawmaking authority.10 
For federal environmental law, however, a review of the case law suggests the 
possible propriety of placing an asterisk at the conclusion of any such hornbook 
statement of administrative law, offering the following caveat: Congressional 
intent in the context of federal environmental law may be fairly equated with the 
intent of Senator Ed Muskie of Maine.  Federal courts in their opinions have cited 
to the views of Senator Muskie in the enactment of federal environmental statutes 
in at least 293 separate cases.11  That is an enormous number of cases.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has itself cited to Muskie’s 
views in fifty-four cases.12  And, the D.C. Circuit of course is the nation’s most 
important court for federal environmental law because it has original jurisdiction to 
hear challenges to EPA rules promulgated under a host of federal environmental 
laws, including the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts,13 and exclusive jurisdiction to 
consider some of those challenges.14 
Looking just to the United States Supreme Court, the statistics are even more 
striking.  The Justices have cited to Muskie in twenty-two different cases.15  They 
include eight Clean Air Act cases,16 and eleven Clean Water Act cases.17  For each 
                                                                                                     
 10. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). 
 11. The number of federal court citations to the Senator, D.C. Circuit citations, and Supreme Court 
citations is based on a Westlaw Next search conducted of all federal court cases as of October 7, 2014. 
 12. See supra note 11. 
 13. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1). 
 14. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (providing D.C. Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction to 
review validity of certain EPA rules). 
 15. See Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35, 48 & n.14 (1975); Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
421 U.S. 60, 84-85 (1975); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); 
Union Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 427 U.S. 246, 258-59 (1976); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 
U.S. 112, 129 (1977); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 296 (1978) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting); Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 599 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); E.P.A. v. 
Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 
329 (1981); id. at 344 n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea 
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 17 n.27 (1981); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
862 (1984); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 129 & n.19 (1985); id. 
at 140, 150, 155, 157, 162, 163 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 366 
(1986); Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987); id. at 424 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987); Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989); Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty, 493 U.S. 20, 28 (1989); 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 490 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in part & 
concurring in the judgment); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 261 
(2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 386 (2006); 
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 231-32 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring in part & 
dissenting in part); id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 
2427, 2453 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 16. See Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Union Elec. v. E.P.A., 427 
U.S. 246 (1976); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978); Chevron v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980); Whitman v. 
Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. 
Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
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of those laws, that number constitutes a large percentage of Clean Air and Clean 
Water Act cases decided by the Court. 
The Senator, moreover, was cited most often by the Court majority in those 
cases, meaning that his views literally influenced the reasoning underlying the 
Court’s ruling.  Seventeen different majority opinions cited to Muskie.18  On ten 
occasions, Muskie’s views were cited by separate opinions, either dissenting or 
concurring in whole or in part from the majority.19  The Justices referred to the 
Senator as “the principal Senate sponsor” and the “primary author” of federal 
environmental legislation.20 
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of those Supreme Court citations occurred 
in environmental cases decided between 1975 and 1989, either while Muskie was 
in the Senate, or after he left the Senate in 1980 to become Secretary of State and 
was still a prominent national figure closely identified with the still-then-recently-
enacted laws at issue in the cases.  That first period accounts for seventeen of the 
twenty-two Supreme Court cases.21  What is more surprising, and ultimately more 
telling, is that although the Court did not cite to Muskie in any environmental case 
decided between 1990 and 2000, the Court has since cited to Muskie in five cases, 
                                                                                                     
 17. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research 
Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); E.P.A. v. 
Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); 
Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); S.D. Warren Co. v. 
Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 
(2009).   
 18. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 48 & n.14 (1975); Train v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 84-85 (1975); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., 426 U.S. 1, 14 
(1976); Union Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 427 U.S. 246, 258-59 (1976); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129 (1977); E.P.A. v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980); 
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 329 (1981); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea 
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 17 n.27 (1981); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
862 (1984); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 129 & n.19 (1985); 
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 366 (1986); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987); 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987); Robertson v. 
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989); Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 
28 (1989); S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 386 (2006).  
 19. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 296 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 
Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 599 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Milwaukee v. 
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 344 n.16 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 140, 150, 155, 157, 162, 163 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Tull v. 
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 490 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment); 
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 261 (2004) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 231-32 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part & dissenting in part); id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. 
Ct. 2427, 2453 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 20. See, E.P.A. v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980) (“the principal Senate 
sponsor”); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (“the FWPCA’s 
primary author”); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129 (1977) (“perhaps 
the Act’s primary author”). 
 21. See supra note 5.  
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including as recently as June 2014,22 thereby underscoring Muskie’s continuing 
influence as an accepted authority decades after he left the Senate. 
To be sure, it is clear that certain Justices look to Muskie as an authority more 
than others, and one can accurately predict that a Justice such as Antonin Scalia, 
who famously decries any reliance on legislative history, has not cited to the 
Senator on even one occasion.  But, putting Scalia’s distinct views aside and 
acknowledging some ideological skewing in the identity of those citing Muskie as 
authority, it is still clear that the Senator’s influence cuts across a wide spectrum of 
views on the bench.  The Justices who cited Muskie the most in their opinions 
extend beyond more liberal Justices such as Thurgood Marshall (six),23 John Paul 
Stevens (four),24 and Stephen Breyer (three),25 to include Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist (three),26 and Justice Byron White (three).27 
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,28 for example, the majority and dissenting 
opinions referred to Muskie by name seventeen times in debating whether the 
Clean Water Act displaced federal common law remedies for water pollution.  The 
two opinions engaged in a lengthy and prolonged debate over the meaning of 
remarks made by Muskie during the passage of that Act.  The dissent stressed that 
the “Court previously has observed that Senator Muskie was perhaps the Act’s 
primary author, and has credited his views accordingly.”29  The majority responded 
that the dissent had mischaracterized what Muskie had said and that the dissent’s 
inaccuracy “appears to be of no little importance.”30  In short, the Justices may 
disagree on the meaning of federal environmental statutes in application in 
individual cases, but they tend to share one common premise: Senator Muskie’s 
views matter. 
Finally, the oral arguments before the Court similarly highlight the extent to 
which Muskie’s views are considered weighty legal authority.  During oral 
argument, an attorney has limited time to put forth her arguments, especially 
considering the many questions posed by the bench.  There is time only for the best 
and potentially most persuasive points; an attorney must identify the critical issues 
                                                                                                     
 22. See supra note 5.   
 23. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., 426 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); Union Elec. Co. v. 
E.P.A., 427 U.S. 246, 258-59 (1976); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 
140, 150, 155, 157, 162, 163 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 366 
(1986); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,  61 (1987).  
 24. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129 (1977); Chevron v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 
332, 349 (1989); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 243 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 25. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 490 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part & concurring in the judgment); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 231-32 (2009) 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Util. Air 
Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2453 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 26. See Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 84-85 (1975); Harrison v. PPG Indus., 
Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 599 (1980); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 329 (1981). 
 27. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 48 & n.14 (1975); E.P.A. v. Nat’l Crushed Stone 
Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 129 
& n.19 (1985). 
 28. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
 29. Id. at 344 n.16. 
 30. Id. at 331 n.23. 
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and address only the legal authority most likely to persuade the Justices in favor of 
her argument or distinguish those arguments that are detrimental to her case.  Yet, 
even in these limited circumstances, counsel arguing before the Court referred to 
Muskie on thirty-four occasions,31 with most of those references occurring in five 
cases.32 
Justice Breyer, who famously believes in the relevance of legislative history as 
much as Justice Scalia does not, has been Muskie’s great champion at oral 
argument.  Breyer has referred to Muskie’s views, including specific quotes from 
the legislative record, six times in two cases.33  And, even that number understates 
the weight the Justice clearly assigns to Muskie’s views.  For instance, during oral 
argument in Entergy v. Riverkeeper,34 Breyer repeatedly questioned counsel for 
petitioner and respondent on Muskie’s views, quoting from statements made by the 
Senator during the 1972 Clean Water Act debates: 
So I go back to page 170 of the legislative history, which I have read now six 
times, and I agree with you that it is not totally clear. Maybe you think it is. But it 
seems to me what he is saying there is just what you’ve said: Don’t go into this 
with some elaborate thing, but remember costs are still relevant. And what I’ve 
been searching for throughout is a set of words that would help me translate that 
thought into a legal reality.35 
Indeed, Justice Breyer’s treatment of Senator Muskie as authority is so deep 
that it apparently extends to the staff who worked for the Senator.  In the Court’s 
major Clean Air Act greenhouse gas ruling in June, 2014, Utility Air Regulatory 
Group v. EPA,36 Breyer mused about what the language and history of the bill 
suggested in terms of congressional intent.  And, in raising that issue with arguing 
                                                                                                     
 31. This number is based on my research assistant’s review in October 2014 of Supreme Court oral 
argument transcripts available at www.oyez.org. 
 32. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc. (arguing counsel referred to Muskie 
eleven times); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (five times); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council (four 
times by both Court and counsel); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. (one time);  
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. (nine times for both the Court and counsel).  Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 5-6, 8, 11, 12, 13-14, Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1 
(1976) (No. 74-1270), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1270; 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, 19, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (No. 79-408), 
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_408; Transcript of Oral Argument at 
8, 12-13, Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Nos. 82-1005, 82-1247, and 
82-1591), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1005; Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 11, Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (Nos. 
83-1013 and 83-1373), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_1013; 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, 43-45, 51, 60-61, Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 
208 (2009) (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, and 07-597). 
 33. Justice Breyer referred to Muskie five times during the argument in Entergy Corp. v. 
Riverkeeper, Inc., and once during the argument in Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A.. Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 20-21, 43, 51, 61, Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. 208 (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, and 07-597); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (Nos. 
12-1146, 12-1248, 12-1254, 12-1268, 12-1269, and 12-1272). 
 34. 556 U.S. 208 (2009). This author was the arguing counsel for respondent Riverkeeper in this 
case. 
 35. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43-44, Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. 208 (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, and 
07-597). 
 36. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
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counsel, the Justice referred not only to Muskie, but explicitly to his chief staffer 
for the bill, Leon Billings.37  No longer were the Justices solely pondering, as they 
have now for decades of environmental litigation: what did Senator Muskie think?  
At least for Justice Breyer, the scope of inquiry has expanded to include the 
question: what did Leon Billings think? 
II.  SENATOR MUSKIE’S ENDURING LEGACY IN CLIMATE LITIGATION TODAY 
Greenhouse gas emissions and climate change are the nation’s, and the 
planet’s, most pressing and most difficult environmental problems.  As stressed by 
the most recent report issued by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), “[c]ontinued emission of greenhouse gases will cause 
further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system, 
increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people 
and ecosystems.”38  Nor did the IPCC, in its most dire statement ever of the 
environmental consequences of continued failure to curtail greenhouse gas 
emissions, express doubt concerning the role that human activities have played, and 
will continue to play, in contributing to dangerous concentrations of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere, absent dramatic change: “[H]uman influence . . . is 
extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since 
the mid-20th century.”39 
Yet, because the associated political obstacles of enacting national climate 
legislation have so far proven overwhelming, EPA has been relegated to relying on 
the statutory authorities set forth in Muskie’s Clean Air Act legislation, first 
comprehensively enacted in 1970 and since amended, including under Muskie’s 
watchful eye, in 1977.  In Massachusetts v. EPA,40 the Supreme Court’s first major 
climate case, decided in 2006, the Court relied on the Act’s “capacious” definition 
of “air pollutant” in rejecting EPA’s then-view that the Agency lacked authority to 
address climate change under the Clean Air Act.41  The Court acknowledged that 
Muskie’s Congress no doubt had enacted the relevant language without the climate 
issue in mind, but by drafting language of deliberate breadth, Congress had 
nonetheless fairly authorized EPA to address issues, like climate change, that arose 
in the future.42  The Court’s more recent ruling in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. 
EPA,43 decided June 2014, is to similar effect.  Building upon Massachusetts v. 
EPA, the Court held that the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program, 
added to the Clean Air Act under Muskie’s stewardship in 1977, further authorized 
EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new and modified major stationary 
                                                                                                     
 37. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. 2427 (Nos. 12-1146, 
12-1248, 12-1254, 12-1268, 12-1269, and 12-1272) (“I get that answer on the language there.  But if 
you had been sitting in Congress and the Senate, Mr. Billings, I think is the staff person, Senator 
Muskie, and suppose that you had this choice put to you with your language.”).  
 38. INTERGOV’TL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, FIFTH ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS 
REPORT 8 (November 5, 2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf.  
 39. Id. at 47 (emphasis in original). 
 40. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 41. Id. at 532. 
 42. Id. 
 43. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
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sources that were already subject to regulation under that Program.44 
EPA’s most important climate change related challenge, however, is yet to 
come, and it is likely that Senator Muskie’s handiwork, and intent, will once again 
be front and center.  Entirely missing from EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations to 
date has been regulation of the nation’s existing fossil fuel electric generating units, 
which are the single largest source of greenhouse gas emissions.  In 2012, the 
production of electricity was the largest single source of total U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions, and coal combustion from existing power plants was responsible for the 
vast majority of those emissions.45   
In June 2014, however, EPA published for the first time a proposed set of rules 
under the Clean Air Act aimed at sharply reducing greenhouse gas emissions from 
existing power plants.46  EPA seeks to leverage its mostly untapped authority over 
existing stationary sources of air pollutants that endanger public health and welfare 
to prompt the States to undertake a series of steps—dubbed “building blocks” by 
EPA’s rulemaking—to reduce existing power plant greenhouse emissions by thirty 
percent in 2030 from 2005 levels.47  These steps include increased coal combustion 
efficiency, decreasing the hours that coal combustion units are used by offloading 
demand to existing non-coal units with lower greenhouse gas emissions and 
available excess capacity, increasing the electricity production capacity of 
renewable sources of power such as wind and solar, and decreasing consumer 
demand for electricity with more efficient buildings, homes, appliances, and 
individual behavior.48 
The ambition, reach, and creativity of the proposed regulations are undeniable.  
What is still an open question is their legality.  Because Congress has failed to 
enact new, comprehensive climate legislation, EPA’s authority is limited to what is 
available under the existing Clean Air Act, in particular Section 111(d) of that 
Act.49  EPA will need to persuade the reviewing courts that although Congress did 
not have these kinds of greenhouse gas control measures in mind in enacting the 
relevant statutory language, the language is nonetheless, as in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, sufficiently capacious to authorize EPA’s regulations.  Because, moreover, 
much of the relevant statutory language within Section 111(d) that will determine 
whether EPA’s regulations  pass judicial muster originated with Senator Muskie’s 
Public Works Committee, the Senator will once again likely be front and center in 
the litigation. 
For example, EPA’s proposed rulemaking raises a host of legal questions 
under Section 111(d), but a central linchpin of EPA’s proposal is that the “best 
system of emission reduction,” within the meaning of Section 111,50 is not limited 
                                                                                                     
 44. Id. at 2446-49. 
 45. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-
2012, ES8-ES10 (April 15, 2014), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghg emissions/US-GHG-
Inventory-2014-Main-Text.pdf.   
 46. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,830 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 60). 
 47.  Id. at 34,832, 34,855-56. 
 48. See generally id. at 34,856-78. 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2013). 
 50. Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2013). 
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to those that can be achieved by on-site emission controls imposed on a facility.  
The agency contends that the statutory reference to “system” allows EPA to 
consider the further possibility of actions taken off-site that are capable of reducing 
the very need for the facility’s operation.  In other words, the “system” of emission 
reduction, according to EPA, includes the possibility of the facility reducing its 
hours of operation or closing altogether because the need that had historically been 
met by a facility with high greenhouse gas emissions can be met by other facilities 
with lower emissions rates or by decreasing consumer electricity demand.51 
EPA’s theory has an obvious, commonsense appeal that can be squared with 
an expansive definition of the plain meaning of the word “system.”  Looking to The 
Oxford Dictionary of English, the agency relies on a “broad” definition of the term 
“system”: “a set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or 
interconnecting network; a complex whole.”52  EPA further argues that the clear 
import of that plain meaning is that “the ‘system of emission reduction’ may 
include anything that reduces emissions” for those sources.53 
But, it is also clear that such a view constitutes a significant expansion of EPA 
authority far beyond that which the agency has historically claimed under the Clean 
Air Act, let alone under Section 111(d).  To be sure, EPA has previously allowed 
sources to comply with pollution control standards by relying on a host of 
measures, including such off-site activities. EPA, however, has never before used 
those measures as the basis for determining the degree of control achievable in the 
first instance.  For EPA, that may be a distinction without a legal difference; 
industry, however, will likely make clear in litigation that they view the difference 
as fatal to EPA’s claim of authority. 
Nor is EPA’s claim that “reduced generation” is a “system of emission 
reduction” an incidental part of its rulemaking proposal.  Just the opposite.  The 
vast majority of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions contemplated by EPA’s 
proposal turn on whether EPA is correct.  While the precise percentages of 
greenhouse gas emission reductions achievable by the various “building blocks” 
described above varies by State, for all States the amount of reductions achievable 
by reduction of demand for electricity produced by high carbon emitting, coal 
combustion facilities is less than one quarter of the total emission reductions EPA 
believes to be achievable by the proposed rule, and for most States it is far lower 
than that.54  For this reason, the success of EPA’s ambitious rulemaking is very 
much dependent on whether the agency can persuade the courts that Section 
111(d)’s language is sufficiently broad to support the agency’s interpretation of its 
sweep. 
                                                                                                     
 51. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Legal Memorandum for Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines 
for Existing Electric Utility Generating Units 50-54 (June 2014), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602-legal-memorandum.pdf [hereinafter 
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 52. Id. at 51 & n.42 (citation omitted). 
 53. Id. at 51-52. 
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EMISSIONS STANDARDS ON EXISTING FOSSIL UNITS UNDER CAA SECTION 111(D) 6 (Aug. 12, 2014), 
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And this is where Senator Muskie, once again, becomes front and center.  In 
support of its interpretation, EPA repeatedly turns to Senator Muskie in both its 
proposed rulemaking and in its accompanying “Legal Memorandum.”  EPA twice 
expressly refers to statements made by the Senator in its proposed rulemaking, and 
adds five such references in that accompanying memorandum.55  Each of the 
references relates to this same core issue: the Agency’s claim that reduced 
generation is within the scope of a “system of emission reduction.” 
In the preamble to the proposed regulations, EPA cites to statements made by 
Senator Muskie in support of its contention that “the legislative history of the 1970 
amendments indicates that Congress recognized that emitting sources could comply 
with pollution control requirements by reducing production, including retiring.”56  
Relying on further statements by the Senator, EPA states in its Legal Memorandum 
that “Congress has recognized” that parts of the Act depend on industrial sources 
“retiring” in order to attain the Clean Air Act’s pollution control standards.57  
Pointing to another Muskie statement, EPA similarly argues that the Senator’s 
discussion of how cities might meet pollution standards by “restrict[ing]” the “use 
of motor vehicles” within their borders further buttresses the Agency’s view of the 
propriety of taking such emission reduction measures into account in Section 
111(d).58  Finally, quoting Muskie yet one more time, EPA proffers as evidence 
that Congress clearly understood that reduction of a source’s operation was within 
the scope of control measures the Senator’s statement that “standards could be 
sufficiently stringent so that ‘effectively . . . a plant would be required to close 
because of the absence of control techniques.’”59  According to EPA, “Congress’s 
recognition that closing plants is a method of reducing pollution necessarily 
encompasses reduced utilization as a system of reducing pollution.”60  What is 
most telling is that in all of these examples, EPA is essentially treating statements 
by Senator Muskie as tantamount to congressional intent and knowledge.  The two 
are effectively conflated for the purposes of legal argument.  “Congress” is 
“Muskie.” 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Senator Muskie’s environmental law legacy is no less than stunning in terms 
of positive impact on the nation’s natural environment.  It takes little imagination to 
speculate what our national landscape would now look like if the economic growth 
we witnessed in the past four decades had not been accompanied by the 
environmental protections for air, land, and water provided by the laws that Senator 
Muskie championed in the 1970s.  All one has to do is look to the environmental 
devastation that has been inflicted on other parts of the globe, such as in parts of 
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eastern Europe and Asia, where dramatic economic growth and industrialization 
occurred over the same time period without comparable environmental protection 
safeguards. 
What is equally remarkable is the enduring nature of Senator Muskie’s 
contributions.  Decades after their first enactment, the basic legal architecture that 
the Senator and his staffers like Leon Billings constructed remains largely in place.  
Repeated efforts to dismantle the architecture, launched sometimes by members of 
Congress and other times within the executive branch, have largely failed.  And, 
even though Congress for decades has largely absented itself from environmental 
lawmaking, Muskie’s voice can still be heard in the federal courts decades after he 
departed those legislative chambers.  His voice is expressed in the arguments made 
by lawyers, and in the judicial rulings themselves, extending to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
The current debate over EPA’s authority to address climate change under 
existing laws tells the same story.  The legal stakes for EPA in defending the 
legality of the Clean Power Plan are huge.  And, the legal arguments that EPA must 
make in litigation are far from slam-dunks in favor of the Agency.  But, EPA 
knows that when the going gets tough, it can rarely do better than to rely on 
environmental law’s true champion: Mr. Clean, the Senator from Maine, Ed 
Muskie. 
